用户 Curve(@ CurveFinance) 的最新消息

@emilianobonassi @LefterisJP @Alexintosh @DeFiSaver @ConvexFinance @ribbonfinance You can always @ me here.

发表时间:4年前 作者:Richard Kirkendall @NamecheapCEO

👍 https://twitter.com/NamecheapC...

@emilianobonassi@LefterisJP@Alexintosh@DeFiSaver@ConvexFinance@ribbonfinance您可以随时在这里找到我。

发表时间:4年前 作者:Curve @CurveFinance详情

@NamecheapCEO That's ok, we are using a different registrar anyway. Worrying about other DeFi projects.
Could be that it's really DNS issue: intermediaries are unnecessary. We need all to do better with ENS

@NamecheapCEO没关系,反正我们使用的是另一个注册商。担心其他DeFi项目。
可能这真的是DNS问题:中介是不必要的。我们都需要在ENS方面做得更好

发表时间:4年前 作者:Curve @CurveFinance详情

@NamecheapCEO Just few billy worth of value potentially at risk, no biggie

@NamecheapCEO只有很少的billy worth有潜在风险的价值,没什么大不了的

发表时间:4年前 作者:Curve @CurveFinance详情

Great that it was figured early! https://twitter.com/NamecheapC...

@LefterisJP @Alexintosh We've traced this down to a specific CS agent that was either hacked or compromised somehow and have removed all access from this agent. This affected a few targeted domains but we will continue investigating.

发表时间:4年前 作者:Richard Kirkendall @NamecheapCEO

太好了,我早就想到了!https://twitter.com/NamecheapC...

@LefterisJP@Alexintosh我们已经追踪到一个特定的CS代理,该代理要么遭到黑客攻击,要么受到某种程度的破坏,并且已经删除了该代理的所有访问权限。这影响了一些目标域,但我们将继续调查。

发表时间:4年前 作者:Curve @CurveFinance详情

RT: An alternate domain has been set-up as a precaution for Convex users.
https://convexfinance.fi/
and
https://frax.convexfinance.fi/
Users are encouraged to use these URLs to interact with the site while the investigation into the DNS hijack is conducted.

RT:已经为凸面用户设置了一个备用域作为预防措施。
https://convexfinance.fi/

https://frax.convexfinance.fi/
在调查DNS劫持事件时,鼓励用户使用这些URL与网站进行交互。

发表时间:4年前 作者:Curve @CurveFinance详情

@0xa9a @newmichwill Yes, that is exactly correct

@0xa9a@newmichwill是的,这完全正确

发表时间:4年前 作者:Curve @CurveFinance详情

RT: @stocastico7 @ProgrammerSmart @BalancerLabs This is a great question. I don't think there's a closed-form solution for accurately pricing Curve LP tokens if underlying prices are different. A lower bound can be calculated by assuming a constant sum invariant and I think this is what most protocols do https://t.co/10t4yDnJsn

RT:@stocastico7@ProgrammerSmart@BalancerLabs这是一个很好的问题。如果基础价格不同,我不认为有一个封闭形式的解决方案可以精确地为曲线LP代币定价。可以通过假设一个常数和不变量来计算下限,我认为这是大多数协议所做的https://t.co/10t4yDnJsn

发表时间:4年前 作者:Curve @CurveFinance详情

@stronghodl Yes, we don't use that registrar, and nothing like that is noticed

@stronghodl是的,我们不使用注册器,也没有注意到类似的情况

发表时间:4年前 作者:Curve @CurveFinance详情

Convex frontend attack (via DNS hijack) apparently affected only 5 users. If you are one of them - contact Convex, but the damage seems vanishingly small.
Investigation still ongoing. It could be possible that safety of certain DNS registrar could be under doubt.
Wen ENS https://twitter.com/ConvexFina...

List of 5 addresses that have approved malicious contracts:
0x496e53c32a69a79a82ed85d2913010dd2f9d1b4f
0x4ffc5f22770ab6046c8d66dabae3a9cd1e7a03e7
0x5b186c93a50d3cb435fe2933427d36e6dc688e4b
0x624301090700ea1e3c5b5224f89adfae405412c1
0x92557b6ffa116b53cf2c3bc1d6d33f78d97ed4c9

发表时间:4年前 作者:Convex Finance @ConvexFinance

凸面前端攻击(通过DNS劫持)显然只影响了5个用户。如果你是他们中的一员——接触凸面,但损伤似乎非常小。
调查仍在进行中。某些DNS注册器的安全性可能会受到怀疑。
温恩斯https://twitter.com/ConvexFina...

已批准恶意合同的5个地址列表:
0x496e53c32a69a79a82ed85d2913010dd2f9d1b4f
0x4ffc5f22770ab6046c8d66dabae3a9cd1e7a03e7
0x5b186c93a50d3cb435fe2933427d36e6dc688e4b
0x624301090700ea1e3c5b5224f89adfae405412c1
0x92557b6ffa116b53cf2c3bc1d6d33f78d97ed4c9

发表时间:4年前 作者:Curve @CurveFinance详情

RT: Investigation is still ongoing, but a quick update for the community:
- DNS for https://convexfinance.com/ was hijacked, prompting users to approve malicious contracts for some interactions on the site.
- Funds on verified contracts are unaffected.

RT:调查仍在进行中,但社区需要快速更新:
-的DNShttps://convexfinance.com/被劫持,提示用户批准网站上某些交互的恶意合同。
-已核实合同的资金不受影响。

发表时间:4年前 作者:Curve @CurveFinance详情

RT: Do not interact with the 'Lock CVX' convex page. Currently it will prompt you to approve a new nefarious contract with a similar address to the authentic contract. The 'Claim' page frontend seems unaffected, however be safe and check your token approvals. @CurveCap @DefiMoon https://twitter.com/ConvexFina... https://t.co/lfVh05EkUV

RT:不要与“锁定CVX”凸面页面交互。目前,它会提示您批准一个新的恶意合同,该合同的地址与真实合同的地址相似。“索赔”页面前端似乎未受影响,但请确保安全并检查您的代币批准@DefiMoon曲线图https://twitter.com/ConvexFina... https://t.co/lfVh05EkUV

发表时间:4年前 作者:Curve @CurveFinance详情

@DayTradingGuy @foldfinance @iearnfinance REVOKE if you see it!
also revoke 0x72a1a639c69f8002f035a7dc231d634d74e6b86e

@DayTradingGuy@foldfinance@iearnfinance撤销,如果你看到了!
同时撤销0x72a1a639c69f8002f035a7dc231d634d74e6b86e

发表时间:4年前 作者:Curve @CurveFinance详情

Careful with convex UI. Something odd is being noticed. Meanwhile - please revoke unknown approvals https://twitter.com/ConvexFina...

Please review approvals while we evaluate a potential front end issue. https://twitter.com/Alexintosh...

发表时间:4年前 作者:Convex Finance @ConvexFinance

小心凸面UI。人们注意到了一些奇怪的事情。同时-请撤销未知批准https://twitter.com/ConvexFina...

在我们评估潜在的前端问题时,请查看批准。https://twitter.com/Alexintosh...

发表时间:4年前 作者:Curve @CurveFinance详情

@JohnLiquidity @AragonProject @Google Anyone can upload anything on ipfs, and gateways should be able to give out ANY information which was uploaded. Not all the domain should be masked as unsafe, but just certain links.
Practically I agree though, your solution works

@JohnLiquidity@AragonProject@Google任何人都可以在ipfs上上传任何东西,网关应该能够提供上传的任何信息。不是所有的域都应该被屏蔽为不安全的,而是某些链接。
实际上,我同意你的解决方案

发表时间:4年前 作者:Curve @CurveFinance详情

@foldfinance @AragonProject @Google Indeed, https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmXmPnApu... or alike would work instead

@foldfinance@AragonProject@谷歌的确,https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmXmPnApu...或者类似的方法会起作用

发表时间:4年前 作者:Curve @CurveFinance详情

Apparently @AragonProject ipfs gateway [https://twitter.com/safety/uns...] is being flagged by @Google as malicious. Shame on Google, cannot trust this "safety" tool!
"Ignore the risk" for this link unborks a bunch of frontends (including https://dao.curve.fi/dao) which depend on it https://t.co/h7I4QpxISA

显然@AragonProject ipfs网关[https://twitter.com/safety/uns...]被@Google标记为恶意。谷歌真可耻,不能相信这个“安全”工具!
此链接的“忽略风险”取消了一系列前端(包括https://dao.curve.fi/dao)这取决于它https://t.co/h7I4QpxISA

发表时间:4年前 作者:Curve @CurveFinance详情

@JonGalt14 It’s not the matter of voting for the sake of voting. Nothing can happen physically with that chunk funds without a vote. We couldn’t take them even if we wanted to, neither could we convert and distribute (otherwise would do it).
Non-custodial!

@JonGalt14这不是为了投票而投票的问题。如果没有投票权,那么这一大笔资金在物理上是不会发生任何事情的。即使我们愿意,我们也不能接受它们,我们也不能转换和分发(否则就可以了)。
非托管!

发表时间:4年前 作者:Curve @CurveFinance详情

RT: I heard you guys like Atomic Swaps from @synthetix_io on @CurveFinance & @1inch
I just setup factory pools (seth/eth & wbtc/sbtc) on Curve to enable Atomic Swaps on @optimismPBC
Volume to follow!
https://optimism.curve.fi/fact... & https://optimistic.etherscan.i...

RT:我听说你们喜欢@CurveFinance&;上的@synthetix\u io的原子交换@1英寸
我只是在曲线上设置了工厂池(seth/eth和wbtc/sbtc),以便在@optimismPBC上启用原子交换
要跟踪的音量!
https://optimism.curve.fi/fact...&;https://optimistic.etherscan.i...

发表时间:4年前 作者:Curve @CurveFinance详情

RT: Step 1) Launch FRAXBP ✅
Step 2) Attain FRAXBP gauge ✅
Step 3) Vote to make FRAXBP a base pool ✅ (⏳)
Step 4) $veCRV whitelist 👈
You aren't here 👈 ... yet.
But in 6 days and 19 mins you will be!
@fraxfinance 🤝 @ConvexFinance 🤝 @CurveFinance https://t.co/3ApYeCSi76

RT:步骤1)启动FRAXBP✅
步骤2)获得FRAXBP量规✅
步骤3)投票使FRAXBP成为基本池✅ (⏳)
步骤4)$veCRV白名单👈
你不在这里👈 ... 然而
但再过6天19分钟,你就会成功!
@fraxfinance公司🤝 @对流财务🤝 @曲线金融https://t.co/3ApYeCSi76

发表时间:4年前 作者:Curve @CurveFinance详情

@Professor_QJ Yes but there was a bug in the code. This deploys a new code which converts the part which was missing

@教授QJ是的,但代码中有一个bug。这将部署一个新代码来转换丢失的部分

发表时间:4年前 作者:Curve @CurveFinance详情